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Abstract—Data integrity is the fundamental for data 
authentication. A major problem for XML data authentication 
is that signed XML data can be copied to another document but 
still keep signature valid. This is caused by XML data integrity 
protecting. Through investigation, the paper discovered that 
besides data content integrity, XML data integrity should also 
protect element location information, and context referential 
integrity under fine-grained security situation. The aim of this 
paper is to propose a model for XML data integrity considering 
XML data features. The paper presents an XML data integrity 
model named as CSR (content integrity, structure integrity, 
context referential integrity) based on a concatenated hash 
function. XML data content integrity is ensured using an 
iterative hash process, structure integrity is protected by 
hashing an absolute path string from root node, and context 
referential integrity is ensured by protecting context-related 
elements. Presented XML data integrity model can satisfy 
integrity requirements under situation of fine-grained security, 
and compatible with XML signature. Through evaluation, the 
integrity model presented has a higher efficiency on digest 
value-generation than the Merkle hash tree-based integrity 
model for XML data. 
 
Keywords- Fine-grained security, XML data integrity, Digest 
value, Merkle hash tree, XML signature. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
General applications of data integrity could exist in many 
domains, including e-government, e-commerce, e-financial 
services, e-business, e-banking, e-learning, e-healthcare, 
mobile communications, heterogeneous networks, digital 
factories, multi-agent systems, and grid computing [1-14]. 
For example, Wu and Chen described the need for data 
integrity when official documents are being transmitted 
between government agencies for e-government in Taiwan [1, 
2]. O’Neill pointed out the importance of data integrity 
through an assessment of a bank’s web service [6]. IBM gives 
an example of data integrity as follows: Assume the data is a 
funds transfer and the hacker alters a random piece of the data 
that happens to be the account number. When the bank 
decrypts the data, the account number is not a valid account; 
therefore, the data tampering is detected and the transaction is 
not completed. However, assume instead that the data altered 
by the hacker node is the amount of money and, changed it 
from 1000 units to 9000 units [15]. In this case, the 
transaction would be completed using the incorrect amount. 
Therefore, research into this area would be of great benefit. 
There are two approaches to ensuring integrity for XML 
data. The first tries to add additional elements to XML data to 
record the integrity information [16, 17]. Without 
cryptography, this method is easily attacked by a hacker. The 
second approach is based on a cryptography mechanism, and 
adopts a hash function to ensure integrity [18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. 
This cryptography-based approach has a higher security level 
than the first approach, although there are two major 
shortcomings in this kind of integrity model for XML data.  
Firstly, existing integrity models generate a digest value 
for XML data content without considering XML data 
features. For non-XML data formats, a user can directly 
generate digest value of the data content to ensure integrity, 
but protecting data content integrity alone is not enough for 
XML data. For example, a signed XML data can be copied to 
another document but still keep signature valid. This problem 
can be utilized by an attacker to forge a document with a 
valid signature. Therefore, besides data content integrity, 
XML data integrity should also consider element location 
information and element context meaning under a fine-
grained security situation. In this paper, fine-grained security 
means that users would encrypt or sign portions of XML data 
rather than the whole.  Location information of an XML 
element refers to the position of this element in the XML data 
[17]. An element has an entire meaning related to its position 
in XML data, and will lose original meaning if the position 
has been changed. Thus, XML data integrity should also 
protect location information of an XML element in XML 
data. Another factor which affects the meaning of XML 
elements is the context relationship.  For example, the 
element will no longer have its original meaning without 
context relationship in an XML data, and the paper defines 
this as context referential integrity, in other words, an XML 
element has an entire meaning only related to other elements 
in the same XML data, but there is no mechanism which can 
be used to protect this meaning in an existing integrity model 
for XML data.  
Secondly, most of these models are based on the Merkle 
hash tree [20, 21], when generate digest value, the Merkle 
hash tree will increase virtual nodes. The hash times will also 
be increased because of these virtual nodes, and this leads to a 
low efficiency on digest value-generation.  
Motivated by the problems above, this paper aims to 
present XML data integrity requirements combined with 
XML data features. Based on the XML data integrity 
requirements presented, it proposes an integrity model for 
XML data, and improves the efficiency of digest value-
generation for XML data. 
This paper presents an XML data integrity model named 
as CSR. The model consists of three parts, and CSR is an 
acronym for these parts: ‘C’ for content integrity, ‘S’ for 
structure integrity, and ‘R’ for context referential integrity. 
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The three parts are combined with a concatenated hash 
function. Content integrity is used to ensure XML data 
content integrity by using a concatenated hash function. 
Structure integrity is used to protect the location information 
of an element in XML data by hashing an absolute path string 
from the root node.  Finally, context referential integrity 
protects the integrity of context-related elements. This paper 
also describes the combination of the model with XML 
specification, and integrates the integrity model presented into 
the XML signature. From evaluation, the integrity model 
presented has a higher efficiency on digest value-generation 
than the Merkle hash tree-based integrity model for XML 
data. 
A.  Contribution 
The major contribution of this paper is the XML data 
integrity requirement considering XML data features, and 
satisfies the requirements with an integrity model for XML 
data with a higher efficiency. The detail is as follows. 
• This paper gives a description of XML data integrity 
requirements related to XML data features under fine-
grained XML security. Three aspects considered are 
content integrity, structure integrity, and context 
referential integrity.  
• Based on presented requirements, an integrity model for 
XML data has been built based on concatenated hash 
function.  As far as is known by the author, this is the 
first attempt to give a formal integrity model for XML 
data considering XML data features. 
• Based on a concatenated hash function to generate 
digest value for XML data, this method has a higher 
efficiency than the Merkle hash tree-based digest value-
generation process. 
B.  Structure of the paper 
The remainder of this paper is organized into sections. 
Section 2 describes the related work of XML data integrity, 
and section 3 introduces theory guidance of this research. 
Section 4 gives XML data integrity requirement and the 
model definition for XML data integrity. Section 5 presents 
the experimental results. Section 6 makes a comparison of 
existing XML integrity approaches, and section 7 concludes 
the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Through investigation, there are two approaches to ensure 
integrity for XML data. The first tries to enter additional 
elements in XML data to record the integrity information. 
Hussain maintained the integrity of XML signatures using the 
manifest element [16]. Mclntosh presented an element 
position attack, and solved this problem by adding additional 
objects in XML data [17]. Without cryptography, this kind of 
method is easily attacked by a hacker. 
The second approach is based on a cryptography 
mechanism, and adopts a hash function to ensure integrity. 
DOM-HASH is the first algorithm proposed by Maruyama to 
calculate a hash value for XML data [18]. In this algorithm, 
MD5 and SHA1 were adopted to generate hash values with 
four different node types related to XML data. The four node 
typed include element, attribute, processing instruction (PIs), 
and text. This algorithm is limited to the contents of the XML 
data and, therefore, does not provide for authentication of the 
internal or external subset of the DTD. Inspired by DOM-
HASH, the XHASH algorithm has been proposed by Brown 
[19]. The XHASH makes use of two parameters: the first is 
the digest function such as SHA1; the second, which is 
optional, can be used to determine how non-significant space 
characters will be handled by default. However, possible 
values for this attribute are limited to ‘default’ and 
‘preserved’. Thus, there is no known way to explicitly specify 
that non-significant space characters should be discarded. 
W3C published XML signature specifications in 2000 
(Second Edition in 2008) [23, 24]. This specification provides 
the format for data integrity expressions in XML signatures, 
and gives the optional algorithm to generate digest value, 
such as SHA-1, SHA-256. However, signed XML data can be 
copied to another document but still keep signature valid.  
Devanbu adopted DOM-HASH and the Merkle hash function 
to maintain the integrity of XML data queries [20]. Bertino 
also adopted the Merkle hash tree to handle XML documents 
[21]. These two methods provide a solution to generate digest 
values of XML data based on the Merkle hash tree. However, 
the element’s attribute integrity has been ignored in the model 
presented by Bertino [25]. Furthermore, the Merkle hash tree 
has a low efficiency. Qiao presented a united-message digest 
method related to XML data integrity [22]. Based on 
cryptography, this kind of approach has a higher security 
level than the first approach. But, this kind of approach still 
has some problems described above. 
III. THEORY GUIDANCE 
A. Types of integrity mechanisms 
In order to ensure integrity, there are perfect means to 
assure the information integrity, such as hashes or check-sum 
mechanisms [26]. Both are used to detect changes to the 
original information. However hashes are more focused on 
malicious changes while check-sums are applied to detect 
coincidental changes. 
In this paper, data integrity is ensured by a hash function 
mechanism. The reasons for adopting a hash function as an 
integrity method is as follows [26]. 
• A checksum is useful in detecting accidental 
modification such as corruption to stored data or errors 
in a communication channel. 
• Checksums provide no security against a malicious 
agent as their simple mathematical structure makes them 
easy to break. An example is CRC series. 
• A hash function has one-way and collision-resistant 
features with a complex mathematical model, it provides 
a higher level security compared to a check-sum. 
B.  Theory basis 
The integrity model in this paper referred to the model 
presented by DOM-HASH and Bertino although the 
construction process is different. The integrity model 
presented by Bertino is based on Merkle hash tree [21]. In 
this paper, the integrity model CSR is constructed based on 
the theory of the concatenated hash function. Just like the 
Merkle hash tree, the concatenated hash function also is 
designed to handle tree structure hash process. The reasons 
for adopting a concatenated hash function to construct the 
integrity model for XML data is as follows. 
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• Concatenated hash functions can handle arbitrary tree 
structure, but the Merkle hash function mainly deals 
with binary tree structure [27]. Thus, a concatenated 
hash function is more suitable to handle XML data. 
• Concatenated hash functions can decrease the numbers 
of hash processes, thus it has higher efficiency in digest 
value-generation for XML data than the Merkle hash 
tree. 
IV. XML DATA INTEGRITY MODEL CSR 
A.  XML data integrity requirement 
In order to illustrate the requirement of XML data 
integrity, an example has been given in Fig. 1, and it is a real 
application document derived from website of NPL [28]. 
Note that some details have been omitted. 
 
• Content integrity (CI) 
The XML data content refers to element name, attribute, 
and values of an element or sub XML data. Content integrity 
means that XML data content will not be changed or 
destroyed in transmitting or storage. This is ensured by 
generating a digest value of XML data. As shown in Fig. 1, 
content integrity for element ‘Title’ should include tag name 
‘Title’ and related value ‘Certificate of calibration’. 
• Data structure integrity (STI) 
An XML data structure integrity protects the location 
information of an element in XML data [17]. It means that if 
the location of an element in the XML data has been changed, 
it will lead to an invalid verification. Location information of 
an XML element refers to the position of this element in the 
XML data. Element location information consists of three 
parts: parent, level, and order in sibling. This position helps 
people to understand the meaning of the element. In other 
words, an element will have different meanings when it is 
located in different positions in XML data.  As shown in Fig. 
1, there are three ‘Description’ elements in line 04, 07, 11. 
The ‘Description’ element has a completely different meaning 
related to its location: line 04 is a description for certificate 
information; line 07 is a description for measurement; line 11 
is the description for measured results. Thus, location 
information for an XML element is an important aspect and 
needs to be protected. 
• Context referential integrity (CRI) 
In most situations, when adopting XML data format, 
without considering element context relationship, only one 
element will also lose its original meaning. For example, as 
shown in Fig. 1, the measurement result has a completely 
meaning related to measurement method or technique 
deployed in the certificate. These two elements are generated 
by different responsibilities. So, it can not be signed by only 
one person, or signed together, because each unit is only 
responsible for its own role. Under this situation, element 
‘Certificate/Results’ has a completely meaning that is only 
related to element ’Certificate/Measurements’. It means this 
kind of testing results occurrence corresponds to a given 
measurement. In other words, an XML element has an entire 
meaning only when related to other elements in the same 
XML data, and these elements have been defined as context-
related elements in this paper.  
Context referential integrity is used to protect context-
related elements of an element in XML data. It will provide a 
binding between an element and context-related elements. 
This means if context-related elements of an element have 
been altered, it will also lead to an invalid verification. 
In summary, the basic requirement for XML data integrity 
is that XML data has not been changed, destroyed, or lost in 
an unauthorized or accidental manner. Considering the 
features of XML data as analyzed above, the detailed 
integrity requirements for XML data are as follows. 
• XML data content, including element name, value, and 
attribute, has not been changed, destroyed, or lost. 
• Element location information, including element parent, 
level, and order in sibling, should be protected in an 
XML data. 
• In order to ensure a completely meaning of an element 
in an XML data, context-related elements should be 
protected together with this element. 
B. Definition of integrity model CSR 
To develop a formal model for XML data integrity this 
paper introduces a definition for XML data as in definition 
4.1. Based on the requirement for XML data integrity 
presented above and XML data definition, the integrity model 
CSR for XML data is defined as follows: 
Definition 4.1 An XML data is a tuple 
),,,( ddD EErVX φ=  [21], where: 
• ae VVV ∪= is a set of nodes representing elements 
and attributes, respectively. Each aVv∈  has an 
associated value Valueval∈ ; each eVv∈ may have an 
associated data content. 
• r is a node representing the document element ( Called 
XML data root); 
• ddd VVE ×⊆ is the set of edges. 
• dEφ is the edge labelling function. 
Definition 4.2 Content integrity )(vCI  
XML content integrity should protect name, attributes, 
value of an element or sub XML data. Let DX  be an element 
01 <Certificate> 
02    <Title>Certificate of calibration</Title> 
03    <ReferenceNumber>TDFRG</ReferenceNumber> 
04    <Description>A single-mode Fibre Attention            
Standard...</Description> 
05    <Data>This reported expanded uncertainty is based 
on...</Data> 
06    <Measurements> 
07      <Description>The measurement of the spectral 
attenuation...</Description> 
08      <Table>Designed figure used in measurement</Table> 
09    </Measurements> 
10    <Results> 
11      <Description>The total attenuation...</Description> 
12      <Graph>Chart related to measurement results</Graph > 
13      <Table>Figure of measurement results</Table> 
14    <Results> 
   M  
15 </Certificate> 
Figure 1. A certificate for fault detection 
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or sub XML data, and h  be a collision-resistant one way 
hash function. “||” denotes the concatenation operator. 
The )(vCI associated with DX  is a function, and for each, 
Vv∈  
⎩⎨
⎧=
leafnodeaisvifattributevcontentvh
verticeaisvifchildnvCIchildvCIattributevcontentvh
vCI
)).(||).((
))).(||||)1.((||)).(||).(((
)(
L
                                                                                        (1) 
 Formula (1) only provides the digest value for an element 
or portions of XML data. Here, 
valuevnamevcontentv ... ∪= . This is also ensured 
structures of element or sub XML data, because 
contentv. should include element name and related value. 
Through the properties contentv. and attributev. , XML 
data content integrity is ensured. The definition is also based 
on a concatenated hash function, meaning that all children of 
an element are concatenated together before, generating a 
digest value. 
Definition 4.3 Label for an XML node )(vL  
21)( CCvL = , here, ∈1C Integer is represented by the level 
of corresponding node v . )(2 vsiblingC =   represents the 
order of sibling nodes, and )(vsibling is the function to get 
sibling order of node v . 
For example, the label for element 
“Certificate\Results\Description” in the Fig. 1 is expressed as: 
31n)Descriptio\Results\eCertificat( =L  
Definition 4.4 Structure integrity )(vST  
For each Vv∈ , )),(()( vrpathhvST =   (2) 
Here, the result is the digest value of path string related 
to Vv∈ , and r is the root of XML data. ),( vrpathp = : 
stringp∈ , denotes a path from root r to current 
element v . The result p is an ordered sequence of one or 
more nodes )()(
1
)()( //// 1 vL
m
vLvLrL vvvrp mL∈ , and r is 
the root of XML data, 1v is the child of node r , mv is the 
child of 1−mv , and v is the current element. )(vL is the label 
for an internal node.  
Through definition 4.3 and 4.4, the location of an element 
can be expressed as a path string from root node to current 
node. This path records the level, sibling order, and parent of 
an element. Through the digest value of this path string, 
element location information would be protected. 
Definition 4.5 Context referential integrity )(vCRI  
Suppose w is the context-related element of an XML data  
v , and write as wv → , then, 
))(||)(()( wSTwCIhvCRI =  (3) 
Formula (3) is the context referential integrity in XML 
data, here Vw∈ . This definition includes integrity of 
context-related element content and its location information. 
Context-related elements can be chosen by a signer before 
signing an XML data with considering context relationship. 
Based on above definition, the model CSR is defined in 
definition 4.6. 
Definition 4.6 Definition of Integrity model CSR 
))(||)(||)(()( vCRIvSTvCIhvCSR =           (4) 
The result of formula (4) is a digest value for the XML 
data. This value consists of three parts: )(vCI , )(vST , 
and )(vCRI , with the three parts combined by a concatenated 
hash function. Here, Vv∈ is the node set of the XML data. 
)(vCI is a digest value of an element or sub XML data, used 
to protect the XML data content. )(vST is a digest value of 
element location information, used to protect the position of 
an element or sub XML data in the XML data. )(vCRI is a 
digest value of context-related elements, used to protect 
context relationship of an element. h is a collision-resistant 
one-way hash function. The combination of these three parts 
is by string concatenation, i.e., by hashing the concatenated 
string lxx ||||1 K .  
In case an element copied from an XML data to another 
document which has the same structure as original one, the 
original data creation timestamp is used to distinguish them as 
defined in definition 4.7. This definition is a combination of 
timestamp with integrity model CSR. 
Definition 4.7 Let ))(||( vCSRthS = be the digest value 
that is finally signed.  Here, t  is an attribute of the creation 
timestamp related to XML data DX .  
C.  Integrity analysis 
The integrity proofs are expressed by three theorems. 
Theorem 4.1 provides the evidence of structure integrity, 
theorem 4.2 proves context referential integrity, and theorem 
4.3 proves that a signed XML data can not be copied into 
another document. 
Theorem 4.1 If an element Vv∈ in XML data DX and 'DX , 
and 'DD XX ≠ , without considering context-related 
elements, then )()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠ .  
Proof: In this theorem, because v is the same in XML 
data DX and
'
DX , and without considering context-related 
elements, there is the same )(vCI , )(vCRI in DX and
'
DX . 
If )()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠ , there must be different )(vST in 
DX  and
'
DX . In other words, v has different location in DX  
and 'DX . Location information consists of three parts: 
parent, level, and order of sibling.  
Assume the path from root to current element v in XML 
data DX  is: int,,/...// 2111 ∈= jivvvp ijj  
Assume the path from root to current element v in XML 
data 'DX  is: int,,/...// 2112 ∈= nmrrrp mnn  
The value of )(vST  in XML data DX : 
)/...//())(()( 2111 ijj vvvhppathhvST ==  
The value of )(vST  in XML data 'DX : 
)/...//())(()( 2112
'
mnn rrrhppathhvST ==  
Because 'DD XX ≠ , there are two kinds of situations as 
follows: 
• Different level 
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If v has different level in XML data DX  and
'
DX , then 
mi ≠ , and )/...//()/...//( 211211 mnnijj rrrhvvvh ≠ . 
Thus, )()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠ . It also means element v has 
different ancestors.  
• Different sibling order 
If v has different sibling order in XML data DX  and 
'
DX , then nj ≠ , and 
)/...//()/...//( 211211 mnnijj rrrhvvvh ≠ . 
Thus, )()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠ . 
The theorem 4.1 is used to judge the data integrity by 
using XML data structure. Because the two XML data have 
different structures, the element location will be changed, 
thus, from the defined integrity model, they will have 
different digest values, and lead to an invalid verification. 
Theorem 4.2 An element Vv∈ in XML data DX and 'DX , if 
the context-related element is 1T  in XML data DX , '1T in 
XML data 'DX , and '11 TT ≠ , then )()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠ . 
Proof: If 'DD XX ≠ , from theorem 4.1, then 
)()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠  
If 'DD XX =  and '11 TT ≠  , then the value of )(vCSR in 
XML data DX  is expressed as follows: 
)(||))(||)((||)()(||)(||)()( 11 vCRITSTTCIvSTvCRIvSEvSTvCSR ==  
The value of )(' vCSR in XML data 'DX : 
)(||))(||)((||)()(||)(||)()( '1
'
1
' vCRITSTTCIvSTvCRIvSEvSTvCSR ==  
'
11 TT ≠ means '11,TT have different content, or different 
structure. 
If '11,TT have different content, then )()(
'
11 TCITCI ≠  Thus, 
)()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠  
If '11,TT have different structure, then )()(
'
11 TCITCI ≠  and 
)()( '11 TSTTST ≠  Thus, )()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠ . 
The theorem 4.2 is used to check for changes in context-
related elements. If the same element has different context-
related elements, regardless of whether or not the two XML 
data have the same structure, it will lead to an invalid 
verification. 
Theorem 4.3 An element Vv∈ in XML data DX , if DX is 
signed and copied to another XML data 'DX , it will lead to 
an invalid verification. 
Proof: If DX  and 
'
DX have not same structure and 
content, then from theorem 4.1, there has  
)()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠ . It will lead to an invalid verification. 
In many cases, if two XML data have same structure and 
content, they should be the same XML data. Thus, an element 
copied from one XML data to another will not affect the 
validation result. However, XML data has its own creating 
time, which can be used to judge the validation of an element 
in an XML data. Thus, the integrity model combined with 
timestamp, to prevent an elements being copied maliciously 
from one XML data to another. 
Assume )(vS is the signature related to element v , 
therefore: the value of )(vS in XML data DX : 
)))(||)(()( 1 vCSRthhvS =  
The value of )(vS in 'DX : )))(||)(()( 2 vCSRthhvS =  
If DX and
'
DX have a different creation time, therefore 
)()( 21 thth ≠ , and it will lead to an invalid verification. 
If DX ,
'
DX have a same creation time, and DX has the same 
structure and content as 'DX , this means that DX is the same 
XML data as 'DX . 
D.  Efficiency analysis 
The cost of a CSR model consists of the following two 
factors: the node size and the depth size. In a aryk − tree 
with a depth of m , in the worst situation, then number of 
nodes that could be hashed is 
1
1
1
1
−
−== ∑
=
−
k
kkN
mm
x
x , and 
the number of hash required 
∑
=
+
−
−
++−==
m
x
mk
x
k
kmmkxkW
1
2
1
1
)1(
1)1( . 
The time complexity of an iterative hash function h can 
be described as a function of its input size l  by the 
function, 21 )1()( cD
lclT ++⎥⎦
⎥⎢⎣
⎢= , where D is constant 
[29]. If v is a vertex of XML data DX , )deg(vin  denote 
the depth of vertex v , that is the number of predecessors 
of v  in DX . Let S  be a subtree of DX . The two 
components of the integrity cost for S are defined as follows. 
The node size nS  of S  is the number of its vertices. The 
depth size dS  of S  is the sum of the depth of its vertices, 
that is ∑ ∈= Svd vinS )deg( . Then, the rehashing overhead 
is given by a linear combination of the node size and the 
depth size of S , that 
is dnSv SccSvincvc
'' )deg(|| +=+ ∑ ∈ , where 
both c and 'c  are constants. The verification time is a 
quantity of the form ∑ ∈+ Sv vincvc )deg(|| ' . 
E. Combination with XML specification 
XML security research has two sides: firstly, how 
traditional security technologies can be used to solve 
problems existing in XML data; secondly, how to describe 
the security technologies in XML format. Based on the theory 
model presented for XML data integrity, this sub section 
describes how the theory model is expressed in XML format. 
The XML data content integrity has been described in the 
XML signature specification by W3C, thus, this section only 
gives the description for structure integrity, and context 
referential integrity. 
1) Specification for structure integrity 
The structure integrity is ensured by three elements as 
follows.  
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• The ‘STIGenerate Algorithm’ is an element, which 
describes the algorithm used to generate the location 
information of an element in the original XML data. 
• The content of the ‘DigestMethod’ element is the 
definition of digest algorithm adopted in this 
specification, and the default algorithm is SHA-1. 
• The content of the ‘DigestValue’ element shall be the 
base64 encoding of this bit string viewed as a 20-octet 
octet stream. 
An example of structure integrity is shown in Fig. 2. 
Syntax: Schema for STI is shown in Fig. 3. 
2) Specification for context referential  integrity 
In specification, context referential integrity includes four 
elements as follows: 
• The ‘CRIGenerate Algorithm’ is an element, which 
describes the algorithm used to generate the digest value 
of context-related elements. 
• The content of the ‘RelatedNode’ is an element, which 
is used to record the context-related elements. 
• The content of the ‘DigestMethod’ element is the 
definition of digest algorithm adopted in this 
specification, and the default algorithm is SHA-1. 
• The content of the ‘DigestValue’ element shall be the 
base64 encoding of this bit string viewed as a 20-octet 
octet stream. 
An example of CRI is shown in Fig. 4. 
Syntax: Schema for CRI is shown in Fig. 5. 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A.  Evaluation environment 
All testing was performed on a PC with a 2.39 GHz 
Pentium (R) 4 processor, 0.99GB of RAM, and MS Windows 
XP operating system. The programming language is 
Microsoft C#. 
B. Evaluation results 
The integrity model for XML data presented by Bertino is 
based on the Merkle hash tree. The model CSR in this paper 
is based on a concatenated hash function. DOM-HASH is 
also based on an iterative algorithm, thus, when all of them 
have the same node size, the efficiency depends on the depth 
of XML data. There are five element numbers on every level 
in this testing. An evaluation has been made to compare the 
efficiency between these models. Let int, ∈iH i be the depth 
of XML data, and the time requirement expressed 
<STI name="structure integrity" xmlns="http://www.example.org"> 
  <STIGenerate Algorithm="http://www.example.org/xmldsig-
csr/#STI" />  
  <DigestMethod 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>  
  <DigestValue>49-2A-ED-1A-5A-E1-BD-9C-59-04-19-58-8F-B7-
08-5C-19-14-15-11</DigestValue>  
</STI> 
Figure 2. Example of structure integrity 
<?xml version = "1.0" encoding = "UTF-8"?> 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  elementFormDefault = "qualified"> 
  <xsd:element name = "STI" type = "STIType"/> 
  <xsd:complexType name = "STIType" mixed = "true"> 
       <xsd:sequence> 
 <xsd:element ref = "STIGenerate"/> 
 <xsd:element ref = "DigestMethod"/> 
 <xsd:element ref = "DigestValue"/> 
       </xsd:sequence> 
  </xsd:complexType> 
  <xsd:element name = "STIGenerate"> 
     <xsd:complexType> 
        <xsd:attribute name = "Algorithm" use = "optional" type = 
"xsd:anyURI"/> 
    </xsd:complexType> 
  </xsd:element> 
  <xsd:element name = "DigestMethod"> 
    <xsd:complexType> 
         <xsd:attribute name = "Algorithm" use = "optional" type = 
"xsd:anyURI"/> 
   </xsd:complexType> 
  </xsd:element> 
  <xsd:element name = "DigestValue" type = "xsd:string"/> 
</xsd:schema> 
Figure 3. Schema for STI 
<CRI name="referential integrity" 
xmlns="http://www.example.org"> 
   <CRIGenerate Algorithm="http://www.example.org/xmldsig-
csr/#CRI"/> 
   <RelatedNode>#myDate</RelatedNode> 
   <DigestMethod 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> 
  <DigestValue>36-C3-C5-A4-02-41-A9-0F-38-B7-C1-7C-7A-
A0-A5-DE-7D-3A-75-9</DigestValue> 
</CRI> 
Figure 4. Example of CRI 
<?xml version = "1.0" encoding = "UTF-8"?> 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
         elementFormDefault = "qualified"> 
   <xsd:element name = "CRI" type = "CRIType"/> 
     <xsd:complexType name = "CRIType" mixed = "true"> 
       <xsd:sequence> 
         <xsd:element ref = "CRIGenerate"/> 
         <xsd:element ref = "RelatedNode"/> 
         <xsd:element ref = "DigestMethod"/> 
         <xsd:element ref = "DigestValue"/> 
       </xsd:sequence> 
     </xsd:complexType> 
   <xsd:element name = "CRIGenerate"> 
     <xsd:complexType> 
       <xsd:attribute name = "Algorithm" use = "optional"  type = 
"xsd:anyURI"/> 
       </xsd:complexType> 
   </xsd:element> 
   <xsd:element name = "RelatedNode" type = "xsd:string"/> 
      <xsd:element name = "DigestMethod"> 
        <xsd:complexType> 
         <xsd:attribute name = "Algorithm" use = "optional" type = 
"xsd:anyURI"/> 
        </xsd:complexType> 
   </xsd:element> 
   <xsd:element name = "DigestValue" type = "xsd:string"/> 
</xsd:schema> 
Figure 5. Schema for CRI 
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as int),( ∈iHT i . The comparison has been made based for 
two different hash algorithms, sha-1 and sha256 as shown in 
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. 
 
Fig. 6 shows that, these models have almost the same 
efficiency when XML data depth is less than 30. When the 
XML data depth is increased, the concatenated hash function-
based integrity model CSR has the highest efficiency 
compared to integrity model DOM-HASH and integrity 
model by Bertino.  The integrity model DOM-HASH has a 
higher efficiency when compared to integrity model by 
Bertino, and this is obvious when XML data has a higher 
depth. It can be calculated that the model CSR has 49.03% 
higher efficiency than DOM-HASH, and 74.72% higher 
efficiency than the integrity model by Bertino. Fig. 7 has the 
same development trend as Fig. 6, but because the algorithm 
sha256 is slower than sha-1, the total time overhead is 
increased as shown in Fig. 7. This indicates that although 
different hash algorithms have an impact on efficiency, the 
integrity model CSR presented is still the most efficient under 
different hash algorithms, and this is determined by integrity 
model mechanism, having nothing to do with adopted hash 
algorithms. 
Without changing node size and numbers, when these 
nodes are at the same level, this report defined it as XML 
data width, the model CSR also is the most efficiency than 
others model as shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9.  Compared to 
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, XML data depth has a significant effect on 
XML data integrity generation process. 
 
The cause of this result is the different numbers of hash 
computations in the three models. Fig. 10 shows the total 
hash times of the three integrity models used in the testing 
sample. Bertino’s model hashes the leaf node 
with )).(||).(( namevhvalvhh , and there are 8 hash 
processes for each element, thus, with the increasing XML 
data depth, the element also increased as shown in Fig. 10. 
DOM-HASH hashes the leaf node with 
).||.||.( pivtextvelemvh , and there is only 1 hash process 
for each element. In model CSR, the leaf node returned 
directly with 1 hash process, and the non-leaf node will have 
2 hash process. Based on an iterative hash function, the 
integrity model hash of the leaf node will increase the hash 
times, which will lead to a low efficiency. Based on the 
concatenated hash function, the integrity model CSR 
concatenates the child node first, and then generates a digest 
value. Because of decreased the hash times, the integrity 
model CSR presented has a higher efficiency than other 
integrity models. 
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Figure 9. Efficiency comparison based on SHA-256 for 
XML data width 
Figure 8. Efficiency comparison based on SHA-1 for 
XML data width 
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XML data depth 
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XML data depth 
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VI. DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS 
A. Existing integrity approach comparison 
In order to summarize the advantages of the XML data 
integrity model CSR presented, this paper makes a 
comparison of existing integrity models as shown in table 1. 
TABLE 1.       COMPARISON OF EXISTING INTEGRITY MODELS 
 
Through comparison, the similarities of the integrity 
model CSR compared to existing models mainly focus on two 
aspects.  
• The integrity model CSR also adopts a bottom-up 
iterative hash process as with DOM-HASH, Devanbu’s, 
and Bertino’s integrity model.  
• The integrity model DOM-HASH, XHASH, Devanbu’s 
model, Qiao’s model, and model CSR ensure element 
name, attribute, and value, except Bertino’s model 
ignored the attribute integrity of an element.  
As shown in table 1, only the integrity model CSR for 
XML data provides overall integrity aspects, including data 
content, element location information, and element context 
meaning. Based on this comparison, the major differences of 
the model presented compared to others is as follows. 
• Integrity model CSR is a formal model for XML data 
considering XML data features. 
DOM-HASH and XHASH just consider the hash 
objectives, and the model by Devanbu and Bertino focus on 
the digest value-generation process. The model CSR 
combined the XML data features, such as the element 
location and context-related elements for example. 
 
Model 
Name 
Description Theory basis Hash times 
each process 
DOM-
HASH by 
Maruyama 
[18] 
)).(||...||)1.(||)1.(||)(||).(()(Re
).||.||.()(
{
siblingnvdossiblingvdoschildvdosvdosattrvhhvs
pivtextvelemvhvdos
=
=  
Here, v is the element set of XML data, h is a collision-resistant one-way hash function. 
Iterative hash 
function 
1 or 2 
XHASH 
by Brown 
[19] 
)).(||...||)1.(||)1.(||)(||).((),(Re
).||.||.()(
{
siblingnvdossiblingvdoschildvdosvdosattrvhhsvs
pivtextvelemvhvdos
=
=  
Here, v is the element set of XML data, h is a collision-resistant one-way hash 
function. s is default processing of non-significant SPACE characters. 
Iterative hash 
function 
1 or 2 
XML Data 
integrity by 
Devanbu 
[20] 
)(,),(),(,(
)(
{)(
21 kvfvfvfvh
vh
vf L=
 
Here v is a sink node, kvv L1 are the successor of v . h is a collision-resistant one-
way hash function. 
Merkle hash 
function and 
DOM-HASH 
1 
XML Data 
integrity by 
Bertino 
[21] 
e
d
a
d
VvifvnchildMhXdvchildMhXdtagnamevhcontentvhh
Vvifnamevhvalvhh
vMhXd ∈
∈=
))),((||...||)),1((||).(||).((
)).(||).((
{)(
 Here, v is the element set of XML data, h is a collision-resistant one-way hash function. 
Merkle hash 
function 
3 
XML Data 
integrity by 
Hussain 
[16] 
<Manifest> contains the data whose location is going to change and apply an XSLT 
transform to omit the URI attributes 
N/A N/A 
XML Data 
integrity by 
Qiao [22] 
))((:
)),((,)),(()(
{ KK
LLKK
MBCDInfohdigestU
MAInfoHBAInfohMBCDInfo
−
−−=  
Here, Info(A-B), …,Info(A-M), … is the sub XML data, Info(BCD…M…) is the united 
hashed result, and h is a collision-resistant one-way hash function. 
N/A N/A 
XML Data 
integrity 
model CSR 
))(||)(||)(()( vCRIvSTvCIhvCSR =  , here v is the element set of XML data, h is a 
collision-resistant one-way hash function. )(vCI is the content integrity of signed 
elements, )(vST is the structure integrity, and )(vCRI is the context referential integrity.  
Concatenated 
hash function 
1 
 
• Integrity model CSR not only ensure the integrity of 
data content, but also provides a method for digest 
value-generation process 
 
The integrity model DOM-HASH and XHASH just 
provide the integrity objects which include element name, 
attribute, and value, without describing the process of digest 
value-generation process. The integrity model CSR not only 
ensures the integrity of data content, but also describes the 
digest value-generation process. Two kinds of element have 
been involved, the leaf node and vertices. It will directly 
return the concatenation of content and attribute if the node is 
the leaf node, otherwise it will iteratively call the function.  
• Bertino’s model ignored the integrity attribute. 
Figure 10. Comparison for numbers of hash computations 
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The content integrity in Bertino’s model is only from 
)).(||).(( namevhvalvhh . This formula does not consider 
the integrity attribute. In integrity model CSR, the integrity 
content includes attributevcontentv .||. , and 
valuevnamevcontentv ... ∪= . 
• Different hash times in the mathematical model. 
Based on the Merkle hash function, hashing the leaf node 
will increase virtual nodes, and then increase the node 
numbers which need to be hashed, which can lead to a low 
efficiency. Based on concatenated hash function, this paper 
concatenates the child node firstly, and then generates a 
digest value. It has been proved that increasing hash 
numbers will not improve the security of hash function [30]. 
Thus, the model presented has the same security level as 
DOM-HASH and Bertino’s integrity model, but because of 
decreased hash times, the presented hash process has a 
higher efficiency. 
B. Compatibility with XML signature specification 
The “XML signature Syntax and Processing” 
recommendation is an internet standard which defines syntax 
and processing model of a special format for digital 
signatures [23]. Standardized contents describe clear 
statement of the regulations on XML signature to maximize 
the security and the extent of the standardized contents, 
integrity, message and user authentication and non-
repudiation. These signatures are represented in an XML 
format and can sign arbitrary resources, including XML and 
parts thereof. 
The structure and processing of XML signatures 
introduces some interesting concepts which will be 
explained briefly. The primary elements of XML signatures 
are digital signature information and digest value 
information (The presentation of XML schema is as shown 
in Fig. 11). Signature elements consist of “SignedInfo” with 
digital signature information, “SignatureValue” with actual 
digital signature value and “KeyInfo” with digital signature 
key information. In particular, “SignedInfo” describes how 
signature information is standardized, the algorithm for the 
signature and the subordinate algorithm. “Reference” 
consists “DigestMethod”, the algorithm summarizing 
signature data, and the element “DigestValue” showing the 
result. “KeyInfo” described in XML security is used to 
illustrate key information in XML digital signature. 
As described in our proposed scheme, the result of CSR 
is a hash value, thus, it can be described in element 
“DigestValue”. The model CSR illustrates the method which 
is used to generate digest value, and it can be described in 
element “DigestMethod”. Context-related elements can be 
described in “Transforms” element. Therefore, the proposed 
XML data integrity model CSR is compatible with the XML 
signature specification, and can be used in XML signature. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper discovered new integrity features related to 
XML data. Based on the XML data integrity requirement 
presented, the paper proposed a formal integrity model CSR 
for XML data. The paper also improved the digest value-
generation process for XML data using a concatenated hash 
function. This paper draws the following conclusions. 
• XML data integrity should not only consider data 
content integrity, but also needs to protect element 
location information and element context meaning under 
a fine-grained security situation. 
• The improved digest value-generation process for XML 
data has a higher efficiency than the Merkle hash 
function-based fingerprint generation process. 
• The formal integrity model CSR for XML data satisfies 
the XML data integrity requirements, and is compatible 
with XML signature. 
Generally, XML data pass a hierarchical network of 
responsibilities (e.g. employees, supervisors) with different 
roles, thus it needs complex workflow on an XML data with 
multiple signatures based on element’s context meaning 
presented in this paper. In order to enhance the constraints 
for workflow, a new multi-signer scheme has to be created. 
Future work identified below mainly focuses on XML multi-
signature based on presented XML data integrity model, to 
build a constraint among multi-signers.  The details is as 
follows. 
• Build an algorithm to divide the XML data according to 
different responsibilities. 
• Propose the constraint among multi-signers, this 
constraint being based on a hierarchical network. 
• Integrate presented XML data integrity approach into 
the scheme of XML multi-signature. 
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